Gifts and Sales of Intoxicating Liquor Contrasted by Editors,
GIFTS AND SALES OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR
CONTRASTED.
A pure and simple gift of intoxicating liquor to one not a
tminor is not a criminal act,' except in jurisdictions where un-
usual legislation prevails. Indeed, there has been some
casual question 2 whether the state has power to prohibit such
gifts. Its power in this respect has been ably sustained in
language worthy of recital: "We may here remark that, if
the state has power to prohibit the sale of liquor, it has also
power to prohibit the giving of liquor by one person to
another. The evil to be avoided is the communication from
one to another of an article -which may be injurious to the re-
cipient, or which, by its general use, may demoralize or harm
the whole community. It is not attempted to restrain a
man's private indulgence in drink. But that is because the
law deals not with the isolated individual, but with men in
their relations to each other. Upon the delivery of a noxious
substance from one to another, a relation is established of
which the law may take cognizance; and it is perfectly imma-
terial whether the transfer be by sale, barter or gift. The ' evil
is not in the receipt of money for the article furnished, but in
the furnishing of it. And so the authorities hold.' It is
probable that such a law would not be construed to prevent a
man from giving liquor to a guest in his own house, purely
in the way of hospitality. But that is a question of interpre-
tation, not of the power of the legislature." 4  The power,
in fact, has been exercised in some states. In Vermont,
the law prohibits the gift of intoxicating liquor, except at pri-
vate dwellings or their dependencies, which have not become
I State v. Hutchins, 74 Iowa, 20 (1887); State v. Standish, 37 Kan.
643 (2887).
' Holley v. State, 14 Tex. App. 505, 5x6 (1883).
' Citing Powers v. Comm. (Ky.), 13 S. W. 45o (i8go); Altenburg v.
Comm., 126 Pa. 602 (x889).
'Black on Intoxicating Liquors, 39. See, also,Wolfv. State, 59 Ark.
297 (1894).
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place.; of public resort.' The exception has not been con-
st:ued by the court to allow other than genuine domestic use
of the beverage. A farmer who treated at his barn and gran-
ary was convicted, 2 as was a citizen who gave away liqudr in
a room in which no business was conducted, but which was
not his dwelling.' The use of the upper part of the building
by others as a dwelling, in the latter case, was immaterial.
The court has not sustained any invasion, however, of the
rights or privileges of the head of a family or household to
furnish them with such food or beverage as he judges fit and
proper for their sustenance and refreshment An innkeeper's
,domestic privilege is as free as is that of other citizens..
-Where a hotelkeeper treated his hostler at the bar, for caring
for his horses through the night, it was held that he had not
violated the statute. 4 For an employe may be an invited
guest within such an exception, and it is immaterial whether
he or the host suggests the treat.5
The Raines law, of New York, may be mentioned in this
connection. It forbids persons to give away any food to be
eaten on premises where liquor is sold. The law was held to
be a proper exercise of power by the legislature, and not to
deprive such persons of either liberty or property, within the
meaning of the Federal or State Constitution Reference
may be made also to statutes like that in Pennsylvania, pro-
hibiting the "furnishing" of liquor on Sunday,7 and to leg-
islation in some states, as Kentucky and Arkansas, forbidding
gifts of liquor within a specified time prior to election.
The authorities recited afford a decisive answer to the query
of the Texas judge alluded to at the beginning of this paper.
Where the statute merely forbids sales, the statute does not
I Vermont Rev. L., 380o.
2 State v. Camp, 64 Vt. 295 (1891).
3 State v. Danforth, i9 AtI. (Vt.) 229 (189o).
1 State v. Jones, 39 Vt. 370 (r867).
5 Powers v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 13 S. W. 450 (I89o).
6 People ex rel. Bassett v. Warden City Prison, 6 App. Div. (N. Y.)
520 (189o).
- Commonwealth v. Heckler, 168 Pa. 575 (1895).
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apply to gifts.' This will not be carried so far, however, as to
protect a scheming individual in any shift or device resorted to
in eVasion of the prohibition. 2 Even where the legislation pro-
hibits gifts as well as sales, the law is understood to apply only
to such devices. An act of hospitality, whereby a host gives
drink to a guest at his table at his private house, is not a gift
within such prohibition.3 Construing an Iowa statute forbidding
gifts and devices intended to evade the liquor law, the court said:
"The section evidently requires the statute to be so construed
as to forbid all gifts for a consideration, direct or indirect or re-
mote, or made with the purpose of receiving anything in return.
Thus, when liquor is given to those who buy other things, or
to induce trade or attract custom, or in a hundred different
ways which the ingenuity of lawbreakers has or may devise to
defeat the law, it is to be regarded as a violation of the statute. 4
Similar construction has been given where the statute contains
the word "disposition." All such legislation is aimed at traffic
followed for a consideration, or motive of gain.' The Minne-
sota court said :" The giving away of liquor is certainly one
method of disposing of it, and, in connection with the sale or
traffic, is within the mischief sought to be remedied. . . . As
IWilliams v. State, 8 South. (Ala.) 668 (1890) ; Gillan z. State, 47
Ark. 556 (1886) ; Ward v. State, 45 Ark. 351 (1885). Where the con-
stitution of a state authorized the legislature to tender to localities a
vote upon local option whether to prohibit the sale of intoxicating
liquor, the legislature could not go further and extend the option to
cases of gifts of such liquor. The constitution, in authorizing the more
restricted question, impliedly prohibited the larger one: Holley v. The
State, r4 Tex. App. So5 (1883) ; Steele v. The State, 19 Tex. App. 425
(188s).
2 State v. Standish, 37 Kan. 643 (1887); Palmer v. State, 91 Ga. 164
(i89x); Marcus v. State, 89 Ala. 23 (1889).
3 Comm. v. Carey, 151 Pa. 368 (t892); Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231
(1888) ; Albrecht v. People, 78 Ill. 5o (1875) ; Johnson v. People, 83
Ill. 431 (1876); Reynolds z. State, 73 Ala. 3 (1883) ; Black on Intoxicat-
ing Liquors, 39. And see opinion of Redfield, Ch. J., in State v.
Freeman, 27 Vt. 520, 522 (1849).
4 State v Hutchins, 74 Ia. 20 (1888). And see State v. Briggs, 47 N. NV.
(Ia.) 865 tI89r) ; State v. Harris, 64 Ia. 287 (1884).
6 Wood v. Oregon Ty., i Ore. 223 (1856) ; Reynolds v. State, 73 Ala. 3
(1882), where there is an excellent opinion by Stone, J. See Comm. v.
Herman, 4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 412 (1895), charge of Yerkes. J.
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remarked by the court in State v. Adamson: 1 ", To prevent
abuses that might flow from the unrestrained disposal of
liquors, . it would seem that the giving away, under cir-
cumstances which might produce the same evil results as-the
scling, would be a matter properly regulated in connection
with the selling. Indeed, it may be regarded as a necessary
'incident' to a statute regulating the sale, to secure its effi-
cient operation.... All experience under license laws
proves this." In the case before them, that of a disposal of
liquor by an u licensed vendor, it appeared that the defendant
was a saloon keeper, but that on the particular occasion
complained of the liquor was furnished gratuitously. 2 His
conviction and sentence were affirmed.
The main purpose of the legislation must be borne in
mind, and this will lead to interpretations differing according
to the circumstances. If a dealer in liquor were to give of
his stock in store, his act would be considered as such "fur-
nishing" or " giving away " as came within the prohibition.'
The gift of a quart of intoxicating liquor was held to be a
"furnishing," however it would be in -the case of a social
drink. ' One who drove around electioneering on a Sunday,
and who, for his personal comfort, carried with him a flask of
liquor, out of which he gave drinks to those on whom he
called without charge and solely to engender good feeling,
was held not to be guilty of " furnishing on Sunday," under
the Pennsylvania Act of 1887, prohibiting the furnishing, by
sale, gift or otherwise, of intoxicating liquors on that day.'
A druggist does not "furnish" whisky when he allows young
men, who have "chipped in" and with the common fund
bought elsewhere the liquor, to mix the whisky with the soda
on his premises. One, however, who buys intoxicating
liquor with another's money, an _ takes it to him with the in-
tention that the two will share, is guilty of " furnishing"
1 4 Ind. 296 (186o).
2 State v. Densting, 33 Minn. 102 (i885).
• State v. Freeman, 27 Vt. 520 (1855).
Dukes v. Georgia, 77 Ga. 738 (j886).
5 Comm. v. Heckler, x68 Pa. 575 (1895) ; Sterrett, C. J., dissenting.
6 State v. Clark, 66 Vt. 309 (1893).
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same. ' Where one takes a fund contributed by all and pur-
chases whisky, and brings the liquor to an appointed place,
where it is drank by all, he is not a vendor, according to what
appears to be the better opinion. 2
Delivery of liquor, to be paid for in kind, has been regarded
differently in different jurisdictions. In Georgia 3 and in Mas-
sachusetts4 it is not punishable as a sale, whereas it is so
punishable in Texas. 5 Whether the transaction is a gift, or
akin to a loan, depends upon the intention.
A defendant who was arrested for the sale of liquor was
fortunate enough to escape conviction by proving clearly
that a payment made in money was a departure from the con-
templation of the parties, and had been made simply because
the other party to the bargain had found unexpectedly that
his own stock of liquor had gone; so that the repayment in
kind could not be made.6
The sale and the giving away of intoxicating liquor unlaw-
fully are distinct and separate offences. Proof of the one will
not sustain an indictment for the other. 7 One who kept beer
in the rear wareroom of a shoe store, and who at times treated
visitors, was held not to be guilty of sale in so doing,8 although
it is necessary to remember, in connection with such a case, the
State v. Hassett, 64 Vt. 46 (i891).
2 Comm. v. Peters, 2 Pa. Super. 1 (1895) ; contra, Hunter v. State, 6o
Ark. 32 (1877). See White v. State, 93 Ga. 47 (1893).
3 Skinner v. State, 97 Ga. 69o (r896). But delivery of whisky for the
hire of a carriage was held to be a .sale, in Paschal v. State, 84 Ga. 326
(1889).
4 Comm. v. Abrams, 150 Mass. 393 (189o). And see Gillan v. State, 47
Ark. 555 (1886).
5 Keaton v. State, 38 S.W. 522 (1897) ; Lambert v. State, Tex. Cr. App.
39 S. W. 299 (1897).
6 Coker v. State, 8 So. (Ala.) 874 (1891).
7 Humpeler z. People, 92 Ill. 40o (r879) ; Stevenson v. State, 65 Ind.
4o9 (1879) ; State v. Briggs, 47 N.W. Iowa, 865 (0891) ; Harvey v. State,
8o Ind. x42 (i88r) ; Kurz v. State, 79 Ind. 488 (i88o) ; Wood v. Oregon
Territory, r Oregon, 223 (x856); State v. Freeman, 27 Vt. 523 (1858) ;
Wlecke v. People, 14111. App. 447 (1883); New Decatur v. Laude (Ala.),
9 SO. 382 (1891) ; Williams v. State (Ala.), 8 So. 668 (iSi). Delivery
of liquor from a speak-easy, on promise of recipient to bring a hen, is a
sale, and not a gift: McGruder v. State, 83 Ga. 616 (2889).
'State v. Standish, 37 Kan. 643 (1887).
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interpretations mentioned earlier in this paper as complemen-
tary to this principle underlying this decision. Where, under
pretence of gift of liquor, a party sells some other article for
more than its value, and gives the liquor as part consideration,'
he can be prosecuted for the sale, but not for the gift of the
liquor. ' A count in an indictment for the sale of liquor to a
minor will not be sustained by proof of gift. 2 " In framing
indictments the safer plan is to have two or more counts, charg-
ing the different offences severally in separate counts. In this
way the indictment will meet the different phases of the
evidence."'
Ordinarily, the difficulty is not in the interpretation of the
statute, but in ascertaining the motives of the parties. -De-
livery of property to another, upon request, for his use, prima
facie imports a sale rather than a gift. 4 It is a question for
the exclusive determination of the jury, in view ,of all the
evidence, whether the transaction was intended by the parties
to be a sale or merely a gift. If intended as a gift, the law
implies no agreement to pay, and the transaction cannot be
treated as a sale. On an information for selling without a
license, an instruction that if the delivery of the liquor "was
not then and there declared to be a gift, the law implies an
agreement to pay the reasonable value thereof, and the trans-
action is a sale," was held to prevent proper review of all the
circumstances. 5 So, in another case, it was held that evi-
l Holley v State, i4 Tex. Cr. App. 505 (x883).
2 Siegel v. The People, io6 Ill. 89 (3883); Humpeler v. The People, 92
Ill. 400 (1879) ; Williams v. State, 91 Ala. i4 (z89o). And see Gillan v.
State, 47 Ark. 556 (1886); Young v. State, 58 Ala. 359 (6S94). An in-
dictment charging sale was sustained by proof of gift, under a statute
providing that a giving away should be deemed to be a selling: Dahmer
v. State, 56 Miss. 787 (1879).
3 Williams v. State. 91 Ala. 14 (189o). In an action for a penalty, a
declaration alleged sale or gift. Demurrer on the ground that this left
it uncertain whether a sale or gift was intended, the statute giving the
penalty for either, was overruled: Hamer v. Eldridge, 5o N. B. (Mass.)
61r (x898). See, also, State v. Hodgson, 66 Vt. 134 (x893), where an
indictment charging either offence was sustained under legislation pre-
scribing just such a form of indictment.
' Dant v. State, ro6 Ind. 79 (x885).
5 Keiser v. State, 82 Ind. 379 (1882).
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dence of drinks on Sunday in a saloon, without anything to
show payment, fails to prove sale; and that no conviction
could be had, as there was no prohibition of gift.' We can
put it-a little stronger still, and be correct. Without an un-
derstanding-albeit an implied one-that there shall be com-
pensation, the delivery of liquor is a mere gratuity and not a
sale
The word gifts must be given an enlarged sense when con-
tained in a statutory prohibition of gifts to minors. A sale to
a minor was held to be a gift within such a statute. 3 The
treating of minors has led to a little conflict and to quite a
number of questions. The better class of cases would seem
to be those which hold that where a saloonkeeper, at the di-
rection of one who pays therefor, delivers a glass of intoxi-
cating liquor to a person under the age of twenty-one, both
he and the adult paying for the liquor are guilty of a misde-
-meanor. All persons who participate in an act or transaction
-which is a misdemeanor are alike guilty. 4  In a case in Ala-
bama it was held that a conviction might be had for selling
IKeller v. State, 23 Tex. App. 259 (1887).
2 Commonwealth v. Packard, "5 Gray (Mass.), 101 (1855). In this case
a witness swore that he called for liquor at a public house kept by de-
fendant, and that a waiter, by defendant's order, delivered the liquor to
'him; that witness had never paid defendant, nor the waiter; that he
offered to pay, but that defendant declined to take anything. It was
held that this was no evidence of a sale.
8 Commonwealth v. Davis, 12 Bush (Ky.), 240 (I876).
4 Topper v. State, ii8 Ind. i1o (1888) ; Commonwealth v. Davis, 12
Bush (Ky.), 240 (1876) ; State v. Munson, 25 Ohio St. 381 (1874). In
the Indiana case, which has been cited in the text, there was an actual
delivery of the liquor to the minor by the vendor, at the request, how-
ever, of the adult vendee. The decision was in 1888. Seven years
before that time a decision had been rendered, which we must consider
.as overruled, although some tweedledum-dee distinctions may* be as-
serted. In the case in 1881 the indictment charged a gift to the minor.
The evidence proved that the adult friend called for two glasses, and the'
glasses were delivered to him, and that he delivered one to the minor by
way of treat. The decision was that the seller had not given to the
minor, and was not guilty. The opinion in 1888 omitted any reference
to the case in i88r: Kurz v. State, 79 Ind. 488 (188i). It may be re-
marked that Kurz v. State has not been treated with favor in later de-
cision of the Indiana Court. See Myers v. The State, 93 Ind. 253 (0883).
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or giving liquor to a minor on proof that the minor and his
uncle came into the defendant's saloon, and that the uncle
called for two drinks; that the defendant set out a bottle of
whisky, with two glasses; that two drinks were poured but,
for which the uncle paid, giving one to the minor, who there-
upon drank it in defendant's presence.'
In Massachusetts and in Illinois the tone of the opinions
has been opposed to the foregoing, although the points in-
volved did not require decision. In a Massachusetts case the
court held that a sale to an adult, who thereupon treated a
minor, was not a "sale or gift" by the seller to the minor-
Very clearly it was not a "sale" to the minor; but there was.
a "gift" by the purchaser to the minor, in which the bar-
keeper participated, by handing to the minor such drink as
the latter indicated.
The court even took such a narrow view of the law as to
intimate somewhat that the delivery to the minor could not
be considered as "delivery" under another section of the
statute, not then before the court. It is difficult to approve
of the decision in this case.2 The court might well have
understood the word "give," in the statute, as used in the
sense of "convey" or "deliver," or it might have said that
all participants in an act of misdemeanor are guilty.
The Illinois decision,3 however, is not open to effectual
attack. It has, indeed, been questioned, 4 but it is only to the
side remarks of the court that objection can be attempted
The decision itself was, that a bartender did not violate a
statutory prohibition of sale to a minor by a sale to an adult,
I Page v. State, 84 Ala. 446 (1887). See analogous case in Walton v.
State, 62 Ala. 197 (0878).2 St. Goddard v. Burnham, 124 Mass. 578 (1878), decided under Massa-
chusetts statute of 1875, c. 99, r5. See, to same effect, Bartman v.
State of Texas, 43S. W. 984 (1898).
3 Siegle v. People, xo6 IIl. 89 (x883).
4 In People v. Neuman, 85 Mich. 98, 48 N. W. 290 (1891), dissatisfac-
tion was expressed with the Siegle case; but whether that was to be re-
garded as right or wrong, the court was of opinion that where a statute
forbids not simply the selling or giving to a minor-but fhrther, the
"furnishing" of the same-then a saloonkeeper who allows the adult to.
treat the minor on his premises is guilty.
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who treated the minor. This agrees with decision in Ark-
ansas, 1 and is correct, no question of "giving" or "fur-
nishing" arising in the case. Evidence that drinks were
taken by a number of persons together, including the minor,
without evidence showing who paid, is insufficient to prove a
a sale to the minor.2  Where the statute prohibited sale
or furnishing-a general invitation to those present to help
themselves from a jug of whisky in a public store, accepted,
among others, by a youth of sixteen, was held to consti-
tute an offence against the statute. 8
. The saloonkeeper, otherwise guilty, is not relieved by an
authorization of the father to give the liquor,4 in the absence
of legislation permitting such authorization. A prohibition
of sale or gift applies as well to one who buys the liquor and
treats the minor as it does to the vendor.
A minor whose disabilities have been removed by decree in
chancery is still a minor within legislation prohibiting sales of
intoxicating liquor to minors. 6
Luther E. Hewitt.
Philadelphia, December, 1898.
I Ward v. State, 45 Ark. 351 (x885).
2 Birr v. People, 113 Ill. 645 (1885).
3 Blodgett v. State, 23S. B. (Ga.) 830 (1895). Those of the company
who pass the liquor around would not be held guilty : Miller v. State, 55
Ark. 188 (1892).
' State v. Lawrence, 97 N. Car. 492 (,887) ; State v. Best, 12 S. E. (N.
Car.) 907 (89i).
5Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. T84 (1859) ; same case, 74 Am. Dec. 522.
The Ohio statute read: "It shall be unlawful for any person to buy for
or furnish to any minor, to be drank by such minor, any intoxicating
liquors," etc. Under this it was decided, in State v. Munson, 25 Ohio St.
381 (1884), that a saloonkeeper who supplied liquor to a minor, to be
drank by him, was punishable, although it may have been purchased
and paid for by another.
6 Coker v. State, 8 So. Ala. 874 (i891).
